music and math: two of my favorite things combined to make something beautiful
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This is all about the word "fuck," so view at your own discretion.
This is essentially verbatim from this Reddit post.
Fuck really is a versatile word.
It’s a noun: I don’t give a fuck.
It’s an intransitive verb: I fuck.
It’s a transitive verb: I fuck you.
It’s an adjective: I’m doing all the fucking work.
As an adverb: I fucking hate this.
It can be apart of a word: abso-fucking-lutely
As almost every part of a sentence: Abso-fucking-lutely fuck the fucks who fucking fuck all the fucking time.
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Just wondering, when was the last Build reset?
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its also a verb 
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It can be used as an intransitive verb and transitive verb, and I made two examples within the earlier post.
As far as I know, the Build dimension never had a reset since its creation in June 2017.
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Actually, “build reset” isnt a verb
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I thought I saw an old post from Rofle talking about it.
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Before dimensions were implemented to Dark Gaming, the single map of the server would reset every so often. There are archives of past maps.
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Oh i see. I guess that explains why build is so crowded.
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Build is probably getting reset, but certain builds will get protected from it -probably zombies maps that haven’t been moved already-.
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Solysis I think you should stop necroing posts…
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Oh my, you’re a moderator now?! Congrats!
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hw 2 gt stone pls im noob
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When would that be?
Also, congrats on mod yems!
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Amid the welter of vague political abstractions to lay one’s finger accurately upon any
“ism” so as to pin it down and mark it out by definition seems impossible. Where
meanings shift so quickly and so subtly, not only following changes of thought, but
often manipulated artificially by political practitioners so as to obscure, expand, or
distort, it is idle to demand the same rigour as is expected in the exact sciences. A
certain broad consistency in its relations to other kindred terms is the nearest approach
to definition which such a term as Imperialism admits. Nationalism, internationalism,
colonialism, its three closest congeners, are equally elusive, equally shifty, and the
changeful overlapping of all four demands the closest vigilance of students of modern
politics.
During the nineteenth century the struggle towards nationalism, or establishment of
political union on a basis of nationality, has been a dominant factor alike in dynastic
movements and as an inner motive in the life of masses of population. That struggle,
in external politics, has sometimes taken a disruptive form, as in the case of Greece,
Servia, Roumania, and Bulgaria breaking from Ottoman rule, and the detachment of
North Italy from her unnatural alliance with the Austrian Empire. In other cases it has
been a unifying or a centralising force, enlarging the area of nationality, as in the case
of Italy and the Pan-Slavist movement in Russia. Sometimes nationality has been
taken as a basis of federation of States, as in United Germany and in North America.
It is true that the forces making for political union have sometimes gone further,
making for federal union of diverse nationalities, as in the cases of Austria-Hungary,
Norway and Sweden, and the Swiss Federation. But the general tendency has been
towards welding into large strong national unities the loosely related States and
provinces with shifting attachments and alliances which covered large areas of Europe
since the break-up of the Empire. This has been the most definite achievement of the
nineteenth century. The force of nationality, operating in this work, is quite as visible
in the failures to achieve political freedom as in the successes; and the struggles of
Irish, Poles, Finns, Hungarians, and Czechs to resist the forcible subjection to or
alliance with stronger neighbours brings out in its full vigour the powerful sentiment
of nationality.
The middle of the century was especially distinguished by a series of definitely
“nationalist” revivals, some of which found important interpretation in dynastic
changes, while others were crushed or collapsed. Holland, Poland, Belgium, Norway,
the Balkans, formed a vast arena for these struggles of national forces.
The close of the third quarter of the century saw Europe fairly settled into large
national States or federations of States, though in the nature of the case there can be
no finality, and Italy still looks to Trieste, as Germany to Austria, for the fulfilment of
her manifest destiny.
This passion and the dynastic forms it helped to mould and animate are largely
attributable to the fierce prolonged resistance which peoples, both great and small,
were called on to maintain against the imperial designs of Napoleon. The national
spirit of England was roused by the tenseness of the struggle to a self-consciousness it
had never experienced since “the spacious days of great Elizabeth.” Jena made Prussia
into a great nation; the Moscow campaign brought Russia into the field of European
nationalities as a constant factor in politics, opening her for the first time to the full
tide of Western ideas and influences.
Turning from this territorial and dynastic nationalism to the spirit of racial, linguistic,
and economic solidarity which has been the underlying motive, we find a still more
remarkable movement. Local particularism on the one hand, vague cosmopolitanism
upon the other, yielded to a ferment of nationalist sentiment, manifesting itself among
the weaker peoples not merely in a sturdy and heroic resistance against political
absorption or territorial nationalism, but in a passionate revival of decaying customs,
language, literature, and art; while it bred in more dominant peoples strange ambitions
of national “destiny” and an attendant spirit of Chauvinism.
The true nature and limits of nationality have never been better stated than by J. S.
Mill.
“A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nation if they are united among
themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and others. This
feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the
effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language and community of
religion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of the causes. But the
strongest of all is identity of political antecedents, the possession of a national history
and consequent community of recollections, collective pride and humiliation, pleasure
and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.”
It is a debasement of this genuine nationalism, by attempts to overflow its natural
banks and absorb the near or distant territory of reluctant and unassimilable peoples,
that marks the passage from nationalism to a spurious colonialism on the one hand,
Imperialism on the other.
Colonialism, where it consists in the migration of part of a nation to vacant or sparsely
peopled foreign lands, the emigrants carrying with them full rights of citizenship in
the mother country, or else establishing local self-government in close conformity
with her institutions and under her final control, may be considered a genuine
expansion of nationality, a territorial enlargement of the stock, language and
institutions of the nation. Few colonies in history have, however, long remained in
this condition when they have been remote from the mother country. Either they have
severed the connection and set up for themselves as separate nationalities, or they
have been kept in complete political bondage so far as all major processes of
government are concerned, a condition to which the term Imperialism is at least as
appropriate as colonialism. The only form of distant colony which can be regarded as
a clear expansion of nationalism is the self-governing British colony in Australasia
and Canada, and even in these cases local conditions may generate a separate
nationalism based on a strong consolidation of colonial interests and sentiments alien
from and conflicting with those of the mother nation. In other “self-governing”
colonies, as in Cape Colony and Natal, where the majority of whites are not
descended from British settlers, and where the presence of subject or “inferior” races
in vastly preponderating numbers, and alien climatic and other natural conditions,
mark out a civilisation distinct from that of the “mother country,” the conflict between
the colonial and the imperial ideas has long been present in the forefront of the
consciousness of politicians. When Lord Rosmead spoke of the permanent presence
of the imperial factor as “simply an absurdity,” and Mr. Rhodes spoke of its
“elimination,” they were championing a “colonialism” which is more certain in the
course of time to develop by inner growth into a separate “nationalism” than in the
case of the Australasian and Canadian colonies, because of the wider divergence,
alike of interests and radical conditions of life, from the mother nation. Our other
colonies are plainly representative of the spirit of Imperialism rather than of
colonialism. No considerable proportion of the population consists of British settlers
living with their families in conformity with the social and political customs and laws
of their native land: in most instances they form a small minority wielding political or
economic sway over a majority of alien and subject people, themselves under the
despotic political control of the Imperial Government or its local nominees. This, the
normal condition of a British colony, is well-nigh universal in the colonies of other
European countries. The “colonies” which France and Germany establish in Africa
and Asia are in no real sense plantations of French and German national life beyond
the seas; nowhere, not even in Algeria, do they represent true European civilisation;
their political and economic structure of society is wholly alien from that of the
mother country.
Colonialism, in its best sense, is a natural overflow of nationality; its test is the power
of colonists to transplant the civilisation they represent to the new natural and social
environment in which they find themselves. We must not be misled by names; the
“colonial” party in Germany and France is identical in general aim and method with
the “imperialist” party in England, and the latter is the truer title. Professor Seeley
well marked the nature of Imperialism. “When a State advances beyond the limits of
nationality its power becomes precarious and artificial. This is the condition of most
empires, and it is the condition of our own. When a nation extends itself into other
territories the chances are that it cannot destroy or completely drive out, even if it
succeeds in conquering, them. When this happens it has a great and permanent
difficulty to contend with, for the subject or rival nationalities cannot be properly
assimilated, and remain as a permanent cause of weakness and danger.”
The novelty of the recent Imperialism regarded as a policy consists chiefly in its
adoption by several nations. The notion of a number of competing empires is
essentially modern. The root idea of empire in the ancient and mediæval world was
that of a federation of States, under a hegemony, covering in general terms the entire
known or recognised world, such as was held by Rome under the so-called pax
Romana. When Roman citizens, with full civic rights, were found all over the
explored world, in Africa and Asia, as well as in Gaul and Britain, Imperialism
contained a genuine element of internationalism. With the fall of Rome this
conception of a single empire wielding political authority over the civilised world did
not disappear. On the contrary, it survived all the fluctuations of the Holy Roman
Empire. Even after the definite split between the Eastern and Western sections had
taken place at the close of the fourth century, the theory of a single State, divided for
administrative purposes, survived. Beneath every cleavage or antagonism, and
notwithstanding the severance of many independent kingdoms and provinces, this
ideal unity of the empire lived. It formed the conscious avowed ideal of Charlemagne,
though as a practical ambition confined to Western Europe. Rudolph of Habsburg not
merely revived the idea, but laboured to realise it through Central Europe, while his
descendant Charles V. gave a very real meaning to the term by gathering under the
unity of his imperial rule the territories of Austria, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands,
Sicily, and Naples. In later ages this dream of a European Empire animated the policy
of Peter the Great, Catherine, and Napoleon. Nor is it impossible that Kaiser Wilhelm
III. holds a vision of such a world-power.
Political philosophers in many ages, Vico, Macchiavelli, Dante, Kant, have speculated
on an empire as the only feasible security for peace, a hierarchy of States conforming
on the larger scale to the feudal order within the single State.
Thus empire was identified with internationalism, though not always based on a
conception of equality of nations. The break-up of the Central European Empire, with
the weakening of nationalities that followed, evoked a new modern sentiment of
internationalism which, through the eighteenth century, was a flickering inspiration in
the intellectual circles of European States. “The eve of the French Revolution found
every wise man in Europe—Lessing, Kant, Goethe, Rousseau, Lavater, Condorcet,
Priestley, Gibbon, Franklin—more of a citizen of the world than of any particular
country. Goethe confessed that he did not know what patriotism was, and was glad to
be without it. Cultured men of all countries were at home in polite society
everywhere. Kant was immensely more interested in the events of Paris than in the
life of Prussia. Italy and Germany were geographical expressions; those countries
were filled with small States in which there was no political life, but in which there
was much interest in the general progress of culture. The Revolution itself was at
bottom also human and cosmopolitan. It is, as Lamartine said, ‘a date in the human
mind,’ and it is because of that fact that all the carping of critics like Taine cannot
prevent us from seeing that the character of the men who led the great movements of
the Revolution can never obliterate the momentous nature of the Titanic strife. The
soldiers of the Revolution who, barefooted and ragged, drove the insolent
reactionaries from the soil of France were fighting not merely for some national
cause, but for a cause dimly perceived to be the cause of general mankind. With all its
crudities and imperfections, the idea of the Revolution was that of a conceived body
of Right in which all men should share.”
This early flower of humane cosmopolitanism was destined to wither before the
powerful revival of nationalism which marked the next century. Even in the narrow
circles of the cultured classes it easily passed from a noble and a passionate ideal to
become a vapid sentimentalism, and after the brief flare of 1848 among the
continental populace had been extinguished, little remained but a dim smouldering of
the embers. Even the Socialism which upon the continent retains a measure of the
spirit of internationalism is so tightly confined within the national limits, in its
struggle with bureaucracy and capitalism, that “the international” expresses little more
than a holy aspiration, and has little opportunity of putting into practice the genuine
sentiments of brotherhood which its prophets have always preached.
Thus the triumph of nationalism seems to have crushed the rising hope of
internationalism. Yet it would appear that there is no essential antagonism between
them. A true strong internationalism in form or spirit would rather imply the existence
of powerful self-respecting nationalities which seek union on the basis of common
national needs and interests. Such a historical development would be far more
conformable to laws of social growth than the rise of anarchic cosmopolitanism from
individual units amid the decadence of national life.
Nationalism is a plain highway to internationalism, and if it manifests divergence we
may well suspect a perversion of its nature and its purpose. Such a perversion is
Imperialism, in which nations trespassing beyond the limits of facile assimilation
transform the wholesome stimulative rivalry of varied national types into the cutthroat struggle of competing empires.
Not only does aggressive Imperialism defeat the movement towards internationalism
by fostering animosities among competing empires: its attack upon the liberties and
the existence of weaker or lower races stimulates in them a corresponding excess of
national self-consciousness. A nationalism that bristles with resentment and is all
astrain with the passion of self-defence is only less perverted from its natural genius
than the nationalism which glows with the animus of greed and self-aggrandisement
at the expense of others. From this aspect aggressive Imperialism is an artificial
stimulation of nationalism in peoples too foreign to be absorbed and too compact to
be permanently crushed. We have welded Africanderdom into just such a strong
dangerous nationalism, and we have joined with other nations in creating a resentful
nationalism hitherto unknown in China. The injury to nationalism in both cases
consists in converting a cohesive, pacific, internal force into an exclusive, hostile
force, a perversion of the true power and use of nationality. The worst and most
certain result is the retardation of internationalism. The older nationalism was
primarily an inclusive sentiment; its natural relation to the same sentiment in another
people was lack of sympathy, not open hostility; there was no inherent antagonism to
prevent nationalities from growing and thriving side by side. Such in the main was the
nationalism of the earlier nineteenth century, and the politicians of Free Trade had
some foundation for their dream of a quick growth of effective, informal
internationalism by peaceful, profitable intercommunication of goods and ideas
among nations recognising a just harmony of interests in free peoples.
The overflow of nationalism into imperial channels quenched all such hopes. While
co-existent nationalities are capable of mutual aid involving no direct antagonism of
interests, co-existent empires following each its own imperial career of territorial and
industrial aggrandisement are natural necessary enemies. The full nature of this
antagonism on its economic side is not intelligible without a close analysis of those
conditions of modern capitalist production which compel an ever keener “fight for
markets,” but the political antagonism is obvious
The scramble for Africa and Asia has virtually recast the policy of all European
nations, has evoked alliances which cross all natural lines of sympathy and historical
association, has driven every continental nation to consume an ever-growing share of
its material and human resources upon military and naval equipment, has drawn the
great new power of the United States from its isolation into the full tide of
competition; and, by the multitude, the magnitude, and the suddenness of the issues it
throws on to the stage of politics, has become a constant agent of menace and of
perturbation to the peace and progress of mankind. The new policy has exercised the
most notable and formidable influence upon the conscious statecraft of the nations
which indulge in it. While producing for popular consumption doctrines of national
destiny and imperial missions of civilisation, contradictory in their true import, but
subsidiary to one another as supports of popular Imperialism, it has evolved a
calculating, greedy type of Macchiavellianism, entitled “real-politik” in Germany,
where it was made, which has remodelled the whole art of diplomacy and has erected
national aggrandisement without pity or scruple as the conscious motive force of
foreign policy. Earth hunger and the scramble for markets are responsible for the
openly avowed repudiation of treaty obligations which Germany, Russia, and England
have not scrupled to defend. The sliding scale of diplomatic language, hinterland,
sphere of interest, sphere of influence, paramountcy, suzerainty, protectorate, veiled
or open, leading up to acts of forcible seizure or annexation which sometimes
continue to be hidden under “lease,” “rectification of frontier,” “concession,” and the
like, is the invention and expression of this cynical spirit of Imperialism. While
Germany and Russia have perhaps been more open in their professed adoption of the
material gain of their country as the sole criterion of public conduct, other nations
have not been slow to accept the standard. Though the conduct of nations in dealing
with one another has commonly been determined at all times by selfish and shortsighted considerations, the conscious, deliberate adoption of this standard at an age
when the intercourse of nations and their interdependence for all essentials of human
life grow ever closer is a retrograde step fraught with grave perils to the cause of
civilisation.
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Wtf is that (not going to read everything, i aleardy hate read school books)
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https://web.viu.ca/davies/H479B.Imperialism.Nationalism/Hobson.Imperialism.1902.htm
Wow thats a long thing, as old things usually are.
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That’s an abridged version, but yep, it is Thomas Hobbe’s Imperialism: A Study (1902).
It’s a polemic against imperialism as a nationalistic business enterprise. Although he does talk extensively about nationalism, the main argument is that imperialism is an outlet for the unsustainable expansion of a capitalistic country.
@0reg0n I didn’t?
You can edit a post once and make a new one every 15 minutes.
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How’d you… ignore the slowmode?
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